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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of firm and market size asymmetries on merger
decisions. To do that I consider a model where a small and a large country
compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms
(with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export
to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a
simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country
have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the
government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than
the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of
interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more
likely in large countries than in small ones.
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1 Introduction
In many European countries there is a heated debate over whether governments
and competition authorities should favor or oppose the creation of national
champions.1 An argument often put forth in favor of national champions is
that bigger firms will be in a better position to compete in world markets.2
It’s true that the emergence of a national champion might improve a country’s
welfare if it has strong efficiency gains and shifts profits away from competitors
in export markets. However, the emergence of a national champion might also
reduce a country’s welfare if the efficiency gains from cost savings are smaller
than the loss from reduced domestic output. A national champion might also
not be able to shift profits away from competitors in export markets due to
losses in market share.
This paper contributes to this debate by setting up a three-country model in
which firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and com-
pete in a third (world) market. This market structure captures the situation in
many network industries, such as electricity, natural gas, telecommunications
or railways. A typical example is the electricity market, where the German
duopolists E.ON and RWE compete with other ‘national champions’ in several
European markets. It is also relevant in markets like cement and dairy prod-
ucts where large national players compete in third markets, but less so in the
respective home markets of their competitors.
I use the model to study endogenous mergers and mergers that improve
national welfare. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of these two games I
am able to clarify which factors contribute to the existence of conflicts of interest
between firms and governments about the desirability of national champions.
In this model mergers have efficiency gains and are modeled as a simultane-
ous move game. Firms compete à la Cournot, markets are segmented, and there
are no producers in the third market.3 The novelty of my approach is that it
allows for both firm size and market size asymmetries. Firms can have different
costs of production and the three countries can have different market demands.
These assumptions make the model more general than previous ones and allow
me state new results that show how firm and market size asymmetries influence
incentives for mergers to take place and merger equilibrium outcomes.
The questions that this paper addresses have many links with the existing
literature on merger and competition policy, specially with papers which ex-
tend the analysis to open economies.4 This literature has taken two different
directions. One line of research focuses on nationally optimal merger policies
1For example, the French government advocated a merger between the electricity and gas
company SUEZ with the firm GAZ DE FRANCE.
2A recent example in Germany has been the aproval of the merger between the E.ON and
RUHRGAS corporations where the German Minister of Economics argued that size was very
important at the onset of the energy market liberalization in Europe.
3This set-up captures the idea that domestic markets are less competitive than export
markets. See Brander and Spencer (1985).
4The traditional analysis of mergers and acquisitions in industrial organization—Salant et
al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985)—usually neglects the effects of country borders.
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and merger profitability when trade policy instruments are available to national
governments—e.g., Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), and Huck and
Conrad (2004). The other line of research is based on the concept of “external
effects” of a merger to outsiders. An important early contribution to this topic
is Farrel and Shapiro (1990). This concept was extended to open economies by
Barros and Cabral (1994). This literature has derived rather general conditions
under which a merger benefits, or harms, the parties not participating in the
merger. It does not, however, explicitly consider that a merger may lead to cost
reductions and so it can not provide a complete characterization of post-merger
equilibrium.
This paper takes a different approach by analyzing mergers with a three-
country model like Haufler and Nielsen (2008) and Sudekum (2008). Both Hau-
fler and Nielsen (2008) and Sudekum (2008) assume that firms have identical
costs of production and that the two competitor countries have the same market
demand but demand in the export market can be larger than domestic demand.
Haufler and Nielsen (2008) find that there is a range of cost reductions for which
a merger is in the private interest of domestic firms, but not in the interest of
the country has a whole. They also find that when the export market is larger
the range for which the merger is blocked decreases. Sudekum (2008) finds that
the promotion of national mergers can be in the interest of individual coun-
tries if rent extraction possibilities are strong enough when firms compete on all
markets and are subject to transport costs.
2 Set-up
Consider three countries: a small country, s, a large country, L, and a third
country, t. Initially there are 2 firms in the small country and 2 firms in the
large country. There are no firms in the third country. Firms in the small and
the large countries sell their product in the domestic markets and export it to
the third country. Thus, there is no bilateral trade between the small country
and the large country and firms compete in the third (or export) market.
The inverse demand function in the small country is Ps = a − Qs,with
a > 1. The inverse demand function in the large country is PL = a − γQL,
with 0 < γ ≤ 1. The parameter γ measures the level of market size asymmetry.
A decrease in γ implies that for any given price, demand in the large country
increases.5 The inverse demand function in the export market is Pt = a− βQt,
with 0 < β ≤ 1. The parameter β represents the market size of the export
market.
Firms in the small and large countries are fully owned by residents and
produce a homogeneous good. There are no fixed costs (this rules out gains from
economies of scale in mergers).6 Marginal costs of firms are given by cv1 = c,
5The reciprocal of γ measures how many times the market of the large country is bigger
than the market of the small country. For example, if γ = 0.25 the market of the large country
is four times the market of the small country.
6Transportation costs between s and t and between L and t are assumed to be equal to
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cv2 = c+∆, where v = s, L and ∆ ∈ [0, (a− c)/3]. I assume ∆ ≤ (a− c)/3 so
that, in the absence of mergers, even the less efficient firm makes nonnegative
profits in all markets. It is useful to define δ = ∆/(a − c) and use it as a
summary measure of cost asymmetry. Following Barros (1998) I assume that if
two firms merge, the high-cost firm ceases production and only the low-cost unit
produces. Therefore, a merger can be viewed as an acquisition of a high-cost
firm by a low-cost firm.7 I assume that firms play separate Cournot games in
each market which implies that each market can be analyzed independently of
the other markets.8 Thus, before any merger has taken place, the problem of
firm si is given by
max
qsi;qtsi
(
a−
2∑
k=1
qsk − csi
)
qsi +
(
a− β
(
2∑
k=1
qtsk +
2∑
k=1
qtLk
)
− csi
)
qtsi.
Similarly, at the start, the problem of firm Li is:
max
qLi,q
t
Li
(
a− γ
2∑
k=1
qLk − cLi
)
qLi +
(
a− β
(
2∑
k=1
qtLk +
2∑
k=1
qtsk
)
− cLi
)
qtLi.
3 Profitability of Conditional Mergers
When a merger takes place there are three effects that the firms involved in the
merger need to take into consideration. First, there is an efficiency gain since
the high cost firm transfers production to the low cost firm. Second, a merger
leads to less competition both in the domestic market as well as in the export
market. These two effects allow the merged firm to have a higher mark-up
than the highest mark-up of the individual firms. Thus, the market power of
the firms involved in the merger increases in both markets. However, in the
export market the merger implies that the market share of the merged firm is
lower than the sum of the pre-merger market shares of the firms involved in the
merger. This third effect reduces the incentive for mergers to occur.9 Thus, a
merger increases profits in the domestic market but it might reduce profits in
the export market.
zero. Transportation cost can be greater than zero (but lower than a) without changing
qualitatively the results in the paper.
7Barros (1998) approach is also used by Qiu and Zhou (2007). Perry and Porter (1985)
and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) use other approaches to model the impact of a merger on an
industry’s cost structure.
8The assumption of Cournot competition is in line with much of the literature on mergers.
Theoretical and empirical arguments in defence of the Cournot model are presented by Haufler
and Nielsen (2005). The model proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in which firms
choose capacities in the first period and compete in prices in the second period generates
Cournot outcomes.
9The fact that a merger always reduces the firms’ combined market share in the export
market, despite the cost savings, is driven by the assumption that the merger merely eliminates
the high cost firm, thereby reshuﬄing some output to the lower cost merger partner. If the
merger resulted in synergies that reduced the marginal cost of the lower cost merging firm,
then mergers would become more attractive.
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My first result summarizes the impact of market structure, firm size, and
market size asymmetries on incentives for firms to merge.
Proposition 1: The conditions under which a merger of domestic firms is
profitable are less restrictive: (i) when foreign firms are merged, (ii) when cost
asymmetries are high, (iii) when the export market is small, and (iv) in the
country with the largest domestic market.
A merger in country i makes a merger in country j profitable for a larger
set of parameters. This happens because (a) a merger in country i lowers the
number of active firms in the export market from three to two if firms in country
j are merged and from four to three if the firms in country j are not merged,
and (b) a move from three firms to two creates a larger increase in mark-up
than a move from four firms to three and both moves lead to the same loss in
market share.
When cost asymmetries are high a merger increases profits in the domestic
and export markets and so a merger is profitable no matter the size of the
export market. When cost asymmetries are low a merger increases profits in
the domestic market but reduces profits in the export market and so a merger is
only profitable when the export market is relatively small. Hence, the incentives
for a merger of domestic firms are higher when cost asymmetries are high and, if
cost asymmetries are low, when the size of the export market is small. Similarly,
the incentives for a merger of domestic firms are higher in the country with the
largest domestic market because if a merger increases profits in the domestic
market but reduces profits in the export market, then the losses in the export
market are relatively smaller in the country with the largest domestic market.
Figure 1 illustrates how the incentives for a merger in the small country
depend on cost asymmetries and the size of the export market.
Insert Figure 1 here
The thin dotted curve in Figure 1 characterizes incentives for a profitable
merger in the small country when firms in the large country are not merged.
The thick solid curve characterizes incentives for a profitable merger in the small
country when firms in the large country are merged. To the right (left) of each
curve firms in the small country merge (do not merge).
4 Merger Game Played by Firms
I will now characterize the incentives to merge assuming that governments do
not intervene in markets. As the starting point, I assume that no merger has
taken place in either country. The decisions of firms in each country to merge
or not to merge are taken simultaneously. The relevant payoffs of this game are
summarized in Table I in the Appendix. Propositions 2 and 3 characterize the
equilibria of the merger game played by firms.
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Proposition 2: Assume the large country’s market is less than or equal to 1.26
times the small country’s market, that is, γ ≥ 0.794.
(i) If cost asymmetries are low and the export market is large, that is, 0 < β ≤
fL1+L2s (δ), then firms in either country do not merge;
(ii) If cost asymmetries are either low or moderate and the size of export market
satisfies max[0, fL1+L2s (δ)] < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ), then there are two pure-strategy
equilibria—firms in either country do not merge and firms in either country
merge—, and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in which firms in the small country
merge with probability
ps =
(63γ − 100β)− (738γ + 800β)δ + (1647γ + 2000β)δ2
(13 + 162δ − 603δ2)γ
, (1)
and firms in the large country merge with probability
pL =
(63− 100β)− (738 + 800β)δ + (1647 + 2000β)δ2
13 + 162δ − 603δ2
. (2)
(iii) If either cost asymmetries are high or the export market is small when cost
asymmetries are low or moderate, that is, max[0, fs1,s2L (δ, γ)] < β ≤ 1, then
firms in either country merge.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibria of the merger game played by firms when
γ = 0.85 (the predictions of the model are similar for any γ ≥ 0.794).
Insert Figure 2 here
As in Figure 1, the thin dotted and the thick solid curves in Figure 2 char-
acterize incentives for a merger in the small country when firms in the large
country are not merged and merged, respectively. The thin solid and the thick
dotted curves in Figure 2 characterize incentives for a merger in the large coun-
try when firms in the small country are not merged and merged, respectively.
The two solid curves in Figure 2 determine the different equilibria of the
merger game played by firms. To the right of the thin solid curve firms in either
country merge. To the left of the thick solid curve firms in either country do
not merge. Between the two solid curves the game has three equilibria: firms
in either country merge, firms in either country do not merge, and firms in the
small country merge with probability ps whereas firm in the large country merge
with probability pL, with ps < pL.
Thus, Figure 2 tells us that if firm size asymmetries are high there will be
mergers in both countries due to the profit gains in the domestic and in the
export markets. When firm size asymmetries are moderate mergers are not
as attractive since they lead to gains in the domestic market but losses in the
export market. In this case we have two possible situations. If the export
market is small, then domestic profit gains are larger than the losses in the
export market and firms in either country merge. If the export market is big,
then we have multiple equilibria. If firm size asymmetries are low, mergers are
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the least attractive since they generate small profit gains in domestic market
and large losses in the export market. In this case we have three outcomes. If
the export market is small, firms in either country merge. If the export market
is intermediate we have multiple equilibria. If the export market is big firms in
either country do not merge.
Proposition 3: Assume that the large country’s market is more than 1.26 times
the small country’s market, that is, γ < 0.794.
(i) If cost asymmetries are low and the export market is large, that is, 0 < β ≤
min[fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)], then firms in either country do not merge;
(ii) If cost asymmetries are low and the size of the export market satisfies
fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ), then firms in the small country do not merge
and firms in the large country merge;
(iii) If cost asymmetries are moderate and the size of the export market sat-
isfies max
(
0, fL1+L2s (δ)
)
< β ≤ fs1,s2L (δ, γ), then there are two pure-strategy
equilibria—firms in either country do not merge and firms in either country
merge—, and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in which firms in the small country
merge with probability (1) and firms in the large country merge with probability
(2);
(iv) If either cost asymmetries are high or the export market is small when cost
asymmetries are low or moderate, that is, max[0, fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)] < β ≤
1, then firms in either country merge.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibria of the merger game played by firms when
γ = 0.25 (the predictions of the model are similar for any γ < 0.794).
Insert Figure 3 here
In Figure 3 the intersection of the area to the right of the thick solid curve
with the area to the right of the thin solid curve represents parameter config-
urations where firms in either country merge. The intersection of the area to
the left of the thick solid curve with the area to the left of the thin solid curve
represents parameter configurations where firms in either country do not merge.
To the right of the thin solid curve and to the left of the thick solid curve firms
in the small country do not merge and firms in the large country merge. Finally,
to the right of the thick solid curve and to the left of the thin solid curve we
have three equilibria: firms in either country merge, firms in either country do
not merge, and firms in the small country merge with probability ps and firms
in the large country merge with probability pL.
The thick solid and the thin dotted curves in Figure 3 are equal to the ones
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 since incentives for mergers in the small country
do not depend on the market size of the large country. However, an increase
in the market size of the large country changes the incentives for mergers in
the large country. Comparing Figures 2 and 3 we see that an increase in the
market size of the large country moves the thin solid curve and the thick dotted
curve closer to the delta axis. This means that for low firm size asymmetries, an
increase in the market size of the large country makes mergers increasingly more
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attractive in the large country than in the small country. This happens because
the bigger the market size of the large country, the greater are the domestic
gains of a merger of firms in that country. So, when firm size asymmetries are
low and the merger leads to losses in the export market, the bigger the size of
the domestic market the more likely is that the domestic profit gains exceed the
export market losses and the more attractive is becomes for firms to merge.
The fact that an increase in the market size of the large country makes a
merger increasingly more attractive in the large country but not in the small
country, implies that now there exist equilibria where firms in the large country
merge and firms in the small country do not merge. This happens when firm
size asymmetries are low and the size of the export market is intermediate.
5 Welfare Impact of Conditional Mergers
This section analyzes incentives for governments to merge national firms. I as-
sume that governments maximize national welfare: the sum of consumer surplus
and profits in the domestic and export markets. To find out the impact of a
merger on national welfare a government must take into account the merger’s
impact on consumer surplus and on profits in the domestic and export markets.
A merger of domestic firms reduces domestic output (even with cost savings
because we move from asymmetric Cournot duopoly to monopoly with only
the low cost firm). Thus domestic consumers lose, while profits rise. Hence, the
welfare impact of a domestic merger on the domestic market is ambiguous: with
low cost savings, the effect is negative, because the loss in consumer surplus
outweights the increase in profits; but with sufficiently high cost savings the
effect is positive since the increase in profits outweights the loss in consumer
surplus. In the export market the welfare impact of a merger is also ambiguous:
with low cost savings the effect is negative, because the loss in market share
outweights the gain from restricting total output and raising price; but with
high cost savings, profits in the export market can rise.
Proposition 4 summarizes the impact of market structure, firm size, and
market size asymmetries on incentives for governments to merge national firms.
Proposition 4: The conditions under which a merger of domestic firms is
welfare improving are less restrictive: (i) when foreign firms are merged, (ii)
when cost asymmetries are high, (iii) when the export market is large, and (iv)
in the country with the smallest domestic market.
The first result in Proposition 4 arises here for the same reasons as the
first result in Proposition 1. When cost asymmetries are high the government
wants to merge domestic firms since the merger leads to a small reduction in
consumer surplus and a large increase in profits in the domestic market and also
an increase in profits in the export market (the increase in mark-up makes up
for the loss of market share). When cost asymmetries are low the government
does not want to merge domestic firms since a merger would reduce profits in
the export market (the increase in mark-up does not make up for the loss in
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market share) and the increase in profits in the domestic market is not enough
to make up for the reduction in consumer surplus. Hence, governments have
more incentives to merge national firms when cost asymmetries are high.
When cost asymmetries are moderate there is a trade-off between welfare
losses in the domestic market (profits in the domestic market increase less than
the reduction in consumer surplus) and profit gains in the export market. Hence,
governments have more incentives to merge national firms when the export
market is large. The conditions under which a merger of domestic firms is
welfare improving are less restrictive in the country with the smallest domestic
market because if a merger reduces welfare in the domestic market and increases
profits in the export market, then the losses in the domestic market are relatively
smaller in the country with the smallest domestic market.
Figure 4 illustrates how the incentives for the government of the small coun-
try to merge national firms depend on cost asymmetries and the size of the
export market.
Insert Figure 4 here
The thin solid curve in Figure 4 characterizes incentives for the government
of the small country to merge national firms when firms in the large country
are not merged. The thick dotted curve in Figure 4 characterizes incentives for
the government of the small country to merge national firms when firms in the
large country are merged. To the right (left) of this curve the government of
the small country chooses (not) to merge national firms.
6 Merger Game Played by Governments
I now assume that governments determine the market structure in each country
and that firms play no active role in merger decisions, that is, if the firms
would like to merge but the government opposes the merger, then there is no
merger.10 Like before, I assume that at the start no merger has taken place in
either country. The decisions of governments in each country to merge or not
to merge firms are taken simultaneously and governments maximize national
welfare. The relevant payoffs of this game are summarized in Table II in the
Appendix. Propositions 5 and 6 characterize the equilibria of the merger game
played by governments.
Proposition 5: Assume that the large country’s market is less than or equal to
2.15 times the small country’s market, that is, 0.466 ≤ γ.
(i) If either cost asymmetries are low or the export market is small when cost
asymmetries are moderate, that is max[0, gs1+s2L (δ, γ)] < β ≤ 1, then govern-
ments in either country do not merge firms;
10The case where the government would force a merger even when the firms opposed it does
not arise, because whenever a merger raises national welfare it must raise profit but not vice
versa (because the merger reduces consumer surplus).
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(ii) If cost asymmetries are moderate and the size of the export market satisfies
max[0, gL1,L2s (δ)] < β ≤ min[g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), 1], then there are two pure-strategy
equilibria—governments in either country do not merge firms and governments
in either country merge firms—, and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the
government of the small country merges firms with probability
qs =
63γ + 250β − (738γ + 1600β)δ + (1647γ + 2200β)δ2(
13 + 162δ − 603δ2
)
γ
, (3)
and the government of the large country with probability
qL =
63 + 250β − (738 + 1600β)δ + (1647 + 2200β)δ2
13 + 162δ − 603δ2
. (4)
(iii) If either cost asymmetries are high or the export market is large when cost
asymmetries are moderate, that is, 0 < β ≤ min[gL1,L2s (δ), 1], then governments
in either country merge firms.
Proposition 5 tells us that if firm size asymmetries are sufficiently low, then
governments do not merge national firms since a merger generates welfare losses
in both the domestic and export markets. When firm size asymmetries are mod-
erate, then a merger leads to a welfare gain in the export market but a welfare
loss in the domestic market. In this case we have multiple equilibria. Finally,
if firm size asymmetries are sufficiently high, governments merge national firms
since a merger generates welfare gains in both the export and the domestic
markets.
Figure 5 illustrates the equilibria of the merger game played by governments
when γ = 0.85 (the predictions of the model are similar for any γ > 0.466).
Insert Figure 5 here
As in Figure 4, the thin solid and the thick dotted curves in Figure 5 char-
acterize incentives for the government of the small country to merge national
firms when firms in the large country are not merged and merged, respectively.
The thin dotted and the thick solid curves characterize incentives for the gov-
ernment of the large country to merge national firms when firms in the small
country are not merged and merged, respectively. To the right (left) of each
curve governments (do not) merge national firms.
The two solid curves in Figure 5 determine the different equilibria of the
game. To the right of the thin solid curve governments merge national firms.
To the left of the thick solid curve governments do not merge national firms.
Between the two solid curves we have three equilibria: governments merge na-
tional firms, governments do not merge national firms, and the government of
the small country merges national firms with probability qs and that of the large
country with probability qL, with qL < qs.
Proposition 6: Assume that the large country’s market is more than 2.15 times
the small country’s market, that is, γ < 0.466.
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(i) If either cost asymmetries are low or the export market is small when cost
asymmetries are moderate, that, is max[0, gs1+s2L (δ, γ), g
L1,L2
s (δ)] < β ≤ 1, then
governments in either country do not merge firms;
(ii) If cost asymmetries are moderate and the size of the export market satisfies
gs1+s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ min[g
L1,L2
s (δ), 1], then the government in the small country
merges firms and the government in the large country does not merge firms;
(iii) If cost asymmetries are moderate and the size of the export market sat-
isfies max[0, gL1,L2s (δ)] < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), then there are two pure-strategy
equilibria—governments in either country do not merge firms and governments
in either country merge firms—, and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
the government of the small country merges firms with probability (3) and the
government of the large country with probability (4);
(iv) If cost asymmetries are high or the export market is large when cost asym-
metries are moderate, that is, 0 < β ≤ min[gs1+s2L (δ, γ), g
L1,L2
s (δ), 1], then gov-
ernments in either country merge firms.
Figure 6 illustrates the equilibria of the merger game played by governments
when γ = 0.25 (the predictions of the model are similar for any γ < 0.466).
Insert Figure 6 here
In Figure 6 the intersection of the area to the right of the thick solid curve
with the area to the right of the thin solid curve represents equilibria where
governments choose to merge national firms. The intersection of the area to
the left of the thick solid curve with the area to the left of the thin solid curve
represents equilibria where governments choose not merge national firms. In the
area to the right of the thin solid curve and to the left of the thick solid curve
the government of the small country merges national firms and the government
of the large country does not merge national firms. In the area to the right of
the thick solid curve and to the left of the thin solid curve we have multiple
equilibria.
7 Conflicts of Interest
This section discusses the implications of the model regarding conflicts of interest
between firms and governments about merger decisions. I show that the model
predicts that if firms of a small and of a large country compete in a third country,
then the conditions under which conflicts of interest occur are less restrictive in
the large country than in the small country.
This result is driven by the asymmetric equilibria of the two merger games.
Propositions 7, 8 and 9 in the Appendix compare the equilibria of the two
games. They show that when one of these two types of asymmetric equilibria
occur, firms in the large country prefer to merge but the government of the large
country opposes a merger. Thus the model predicts that, everything else con-
stant, competition authorities should be less actively involved in the regulation
of export industries in small countries than in large ones.
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Figures 7, 8 and 9 display the curves that determine the equilibria of the two
merger games when γ = 0.85 (the predictions of the model regarding conflicts
of interest are similar for any γ > 0.794), γ = 0.55 (the predictions of the model
are similar for any γ ∈ (0.466, 0.794)), and γ = 0.25 (the predictions of the
model are similar for any γ < 0.466), respectively.
Insert Figures 7, 8 and 9 here
In Figures 7, 8 and 9 the negatively sloped curves determine the set of
equilibria of the merger game played by firms. To the right of the thin solid
negatively sloped curve firms in either country merge. To the left of the thick
solid negatively sloped curve firms in either country do not merge. The positively
sloped curves determine the set of equilibria of the merger game played by
governments. To the right of the thin solid positively sloped curve governments
in either country merge national firms. To the left of the thick solid positively
sloped curve governments in either country do not merge national firms.
We can see from Figures 7, 8 and 9 that if firm size asymmetries are high
and the export market is large, then there are no conflicts of interest between
national firms and governments: all favor a merger. The interests of national
firms and governments are also aligned if firm size asymmetries are low and
the export market is large: all are against a merger. However, if firm size
asymmetries are moderate or low and the export market is relatively small,
then a conflict of interest arises: firms wish to merge but governments oppose
the mergers.
Comparing Figures 7, 8 and 9 we also see that an increase in market size
asymmetry between the large and the small countries—a decrease in γ—increases
the likelihood of conflicts of interest in the large country. In Figure 8 the market
size asymmetry is moderate and we find parameter configurations where firms in
the large country want to merge, firms in the small country do not want to merge,
and governments oppose mergers. In Figure 9 the market size asymmetry is high
and there are (i) parameter configurations where firms in the large country want
to merge, firms in the small country do not want to merge, and governments
oppose mergers, and (ii) parameter configurations where the government of the
large country opposes a merger, the government of the small country favors a
merger, and firms in either country want to merge. Hence, the conditions under
which conflicts of interest occur in the large country are less restrictive than
those in the small country.
8 Extensions
There are many possible directions in which one could extend this model. For
example, one could relax the assumption that exports are only to the third
country. Bilateral trade between the small and the large country has two ef-
fects. First, each exporting country has one more export market (the rival’s
market). Second, it increases the number of firms selling in domestic markets.
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The additional export market leads to a larger increase in profits in the for-
eign markets following a merger when cost asymmetries are high and a smaller
increase when cost asymmetries are low. An increase in competition in the
domestic market leads to a smaller increase in profits in the domestic market
following a merger when cost asymmetries are high and a reduction in profits
in the domestic market when cost asymmetries are low. Thus, allowing for bi-
lateral trade makes a merger less attractive to firms for low cost asymmetries
since profits in the domestic and in the export markets are lower. For high cost
asymmetries the result depends on the relative sizes of the markets. Let’s now
turn to the impact of bilateral trade on welfare. An increase in competition
in the domestic market leads to a lower reduction in consumer surplus follow-
ing a merger since a move from four to three firms (when foreign firms are not
merged) or from three to two (when foreign firms are merged) reduces consumer
surplus by less than a move from two to one. This implies that bilateral trade
makes a merger more attractive to governments when cost asymmetries are high
since domestic welfare and profits in the export market are higher than without
bilateral trade. When cost asymmetries are low the impact of bilateral trade on
the attractiveness of a merger to governments depends on the relative size of the
markets. Thus, bilateral trade between the small and the large country reduces
conflicts of interest between firms and governments when cost asymmetries are
high and its impact on conflicts of interest is ambiguous when cost asymmetries
are low.
Another possible extension is to assume that exports from firms in the small
and large countries must compete against local production from firms in the
third country. The impact of competition from firms in the third country on
incentives for firms to merge in either the small or the large country depends on
the cost savings induced by the merger. Mergers would be less (more) attractive
to firms if cost asymmetries are high (low) because the gains (losses) in the
export market are lower. Competition from firms of the third country market
makes mergers less attractive to governments since the gains from a merger in
the export market are smaller. Thus, the presence of additional competitors in
the export market should increase the likelihood of conflicts of interest between
firms and governments when cost asymmetries are low but not when they are
high.
Yet another extension of the model would be to break the assumption that
the firm size asymmetries in the small and the large country are the same. For
example, one could assume that firms in the large country are uniformly more
(or less) efficient than firms in the small country. This extension complicates the
analysis since it is no longer possible to find closed form solutions for market size
thresholds that define the set of equilibria of the model. However, it is possible
to parameterize the model numerically to study this possibility.
One could also relax the assumption that there are only two national firms
in each country. Doing that makes the analysis of the merger game considerably
more complicated. For example, if there are three national firms in each country
we would need to consider all possible merger combinations. We would need to
state not only individually rational constraints for mergers to be viable but also
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stability conditions under which the firms outside the mergers would not make
a better offer to one of the participants in the merger.11
If competition were in prices with differentiated products mergers would
always be profitable since in that case mergers increase mark-ups both domes-
tically and in the export market but there would be no loss of market share
effect of a merger. However, the effects on a country’s welfare would still be
ambiguous due to the price increases domestically, and the conflicts of interest
between governments and firms would still depend on the relative sizes of the
markets.
An interesting extension of the model would be to study explicitly a game
between national firms and competition authorities where firms propose mergers
and competition authorities accept or reject mergers proposed by firms. This
extension introduces a dynamic aspect to merger analysis in open economies
that has not yet been sufficiently explored.12 This would be a middle ground
between the merger game played by firms and the one played by governments.
9 Conclusion
This paper studies incentives for national mergers in a model where firms of two
countries compete in a third country market. The main novelty of the paper is
that it characterizes incentives for national firms to merge and for governments
to promote national mergers when firms can have different cost of production
and countries can have different market demands.
The paper finds that firms in the large country have more incentives to
merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large
country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small
country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments
and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in
small ones.
11See Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001) for closed economy models of mergers in
markets with two or more firms.
12See Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) for an example of this type of model in a closed economy.
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11 Appendix
Lemma 1:
(i) If 9100
7−82δ+183δ2
1+8δ−20δ2
= fL1,L2s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and firms in the large country are
not merged, then a merger in the small country is profitable;
(ii) If 12
1−18δ+45δ2
1+8δ−20δ2
= fL1+L2s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and firms in the large country are
merged, then a merger in the small country is profitable;
(iii) If 9γ100
7−82δ+183δ2
1+8δ−20δ2
= fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and firms in the small country
are not merged, then a merger in the large country is profitable;
(iv) If γ2
1−18δ+45δ2
1+8δ−20δ2
= fs1+s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and firms in the small country are
merged, then a merger in the large country is profitable.
Proof of Lemma 1: I start the proof by deriving the conditions under which
a merger in s is profitable conditional on a given market structure in L. If s
firms are not merged they sell qs1 = (a− c+∆)/3 and qs2 = (a− c− 2∆)/3 in
the s market. In this case, profits of s firms in the s market are given by πss1 =
(a− c+∆)2 /9 and πss2 = (a− c− 2∆)
2 /9. If L firms are not merged they sell
qL1 = (a− c+∆)/3γ and qL2 = (a− c− 2∆) /3γ in the L market. Profits of L
firms in the L market are πLL1 = (a− c+∆)
2 /9γ and πLL2 = (a− c− 2∆)
2 /9γ.
The market equilibrium in t is given by:
qts1 =
a− c
2β
−
1
2
(
qts2 + q
t
L1 + q
t
L2
)
qts2 =
a− c−∆
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1 + q
t
L1 + q
t
L2
)
qtL1 =
a− c
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1 + q
t
s2 + q
t
L2
)
qtL2 =
a− c−∆
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1 + q
t
s2 + q
t
L1
)
Solving this system we obtain qts1 = q
t
L1 = (a − c + 2∆)/5β and q
t
s2 = q
t
L2 =
(a − c − 3∆)/5β. The profits of s and L firms in t are given by πts1 = π
t
L1 =
(a− c+ 2∆)2 /25β and πts2 = π
t
L2 = (a− c− 3∆)
2 /25β.
If s firms merge the s market becomes a monopoly and the equilibrium quantity
is qs1+s2 = (a − c)/2. The monopoly profits are πs1+s2 = (a− c)
2/4. If s firms
merge and L firms are not merged, then the equilibrium in t is given by
qts1+s2 =
a− c
2β
−
1
2
(
qtL1 + q
t
L2
)
qtL1 =
a− c
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1+s2 + q
t
L2
)
qtL2 =
a− c−∆
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1+s2 + q
t
L1
)
Solving this system we obtain qts1+s2 = q
t
L1 = (a−c+∆)/4β and q
t
L2 = (a−c−
3∆)/4β. The profits of the merged s firm in t are πts1+s2 = (a− c+∆)
2/16β. A
merger of s firms is profitable when L firms are not merged if the total profits
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of the merged s firm are greater than the sum of the profits of the s firms before
the merger, that is,
(a− c)2
4
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
≥
(a− c+∆)2
9
+
(a− c− 2∆)
2
9
+
(a− c+ 2∆)2
25β
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
25β
.
Solving this inequality with respect to β we obtain β ≥ fL1,L2s (δ) which proves
part (i). If s firms are not merged but L firms are, the equilibrium in t is given
by:
qts1 =
a− c
2β
−
1
2
(
qts2 + q
t
L1+L2
)
qts2 =
a− c−∆
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1 + q
t
L1+L2
)
qtL1+L2 =
a− c
2β
−
1
2
(
qts1 + q
t
s2
)
The solution to this system is qtL1+L2 = q
t
s1 = (a − c + ∆)/4β and q
t
s2 =
(a − c − 3∆)/4β. The profits of s1 in t are πts1 = (a − c + ∆)
2/16β and the
profits of s2 are πts2 = (a− c− 3∆)
2/16β. If s firms merge and so do L firms we
have a duopoly in the t. In this case the equilibrium quantities in t are qts1+s2 =
qtL1+L2 = (a− c)/3β and profits of the merged s firm by π
t
s1+s2 = (a− c)
2/9β.
Thus, a merger of s firms is profitable when L firms are merged if
(a− c)2
[
1
4
+
1
9β
]
≥ (a− c+∆)2
[
1
9
+
1
16β
]
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
16β
.
Solving this inequality with respect to β we obtain β ≥ fL1+L2s (δ) which proves
part (ii). Similarly, a merger of L firms is profitable when s firms are not merged
if
(a− c)2
4γ
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
≥
(a− c+∆)
2
9γ
+
(a− c+ 2∆)2
25β
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
25β
.
Solving this inequality with respect to β we obtain β ≥ fs1,s2L (δ, γ) which proves
part (iii). A merger of L firms is profitable when s firms are merged if
(a−c)2
[
1
4γ
+
1
9β
]
≥ (a− c+∆)2
[
1
9γ
+
1
16β
]
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
16β
.
Solving this inequality with respect to β we obtain β ≥ fs1+s2L (δ, γ) which proves
part (iv). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1: (i) We know from Lemma 1 part (i) that firms in s
wish to merge when firms in L are not merged when fL1,L2s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1.We know
from Lemma part (ii) that firms in s wish to merge when firms in L are merged
when fL1+L2s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1. The conditions under which firms in s decide to merge
are less restrictive when firms in L are merged since fL1,L2s (δ) − f
L1+L2
s (δ) =
1
100
13+162δ−603δ2
1+8δ−20δ2
> 0 for δ ∈ [0, 1/3].
(ii) Suppose that firms in L are not merged. From Lemma 1 part (i) we have
fL1,L2s (δ) ≤ 0 for δ ∈ [7/61, 1/3]. This means that if δ ∈ [7/61, 1/3], then firms
in s wish to merge when firms in L are not merged for any β. However, if
δ ∈ [0, 7/61), firms in s only wish to merge when firms in L are not merged as
long as β ≥ fL1,L2s (δ).
(iii) Suppose that firms in L are not merged. From Lemma 1 part (i) we have
fL1,L2s (0) = 0.63. This means that if β ∈ [0.63, 1], then firms in s wish to merge
when firms in L are not merged for any δ. However, if β ∈ (0, 0.63), firms in s
only wish to merge when firms in L are not merged as long as β ≥ fL1,L2s (δ).
(iv) We know from Lemma 1 part (i) that firms in s wish to merge when firms
in L are not merged when fL1,L2s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1.We know from Lemma 1 part (iii)
that firms in L wish to merge when firms in s are not merged when fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤
β ≤ 1. The conditions under which firms in L decide to merge when firms in s
are not merged are less restrictive than the conditions under which firms in s
decide to merge when firms in L are not merged since fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ f
L1,L2
s (δ)
for all (γ, δ). Q.E.D.
Table I displays the strategies and payoffs in the merger game played by firms.
The upper left part of each cell displays the profits of the merged firm in s
(if there is a merger) or the sum of profits of the two firms in s (if there is no
merger). The lower right part of each cell displays the profits of the merged firm
in L (if there is a merger) or the sum of profits of the two firms in L (if there
is no merger). Denote the firms’ strategies in the small country as m (merger)
and n (no merger) and in the large country as M (merger) and N (no merger).
Denote the game played by firms by F2,γ and its Nash equilibria by NE(F2,γ).
Table I
s\L M N
m
(a−c)2
4
+ (a−c)
2
9β ,
(a−c)2
4γ
+ (a−c)
2
9β
(a−c)2
4
+ (a−c+∆)
2
16β ,
(a−c+∆)2+(a−c−2∆)2
9γ
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
16β
n
(a−c+∆)2+(a−c−2∆)2
9
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
16β ,
(a−c)2
4γ
+ (a−c+∆)
2
16β
(a−c+∆)2+(a−c−2∆)2
9
+ (a−c+2∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
25β ,
(a−c+∆)2+(a−c−2∆)2
9γ
+ (a−c+2∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
25β
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Lemma 2: Let δ∗(γ) = 50−63γ750−549γ .
(i) If (γ, δ) satisfy 0 < γ < 0.794 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ∗(γ), then fs1+s2L (δ, γ) <
fs1,s2L (δ, γ) < f
L1+L2
s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ).
(ii) If δ = δ∗(γ), then fs1+s2L (δ, γ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) = f
L1+L2
s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ).
(iii) If (γ, δ) satisfy 0 < γ ≤ 0.794 and δ∗(γ) < δ ≤ 0.0(6), then fs1+s2L (δ, γ) <
fL1+L2s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ).
(iv) If 0.794 < γ < 1, then fs1+s2L (δ, γ) < f
L1+L2
s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ).
(v) If γ = 1, then fs1+s2L (δ, γ) = f
L1+L2
s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) = f
L1,L2
s (δ).
Proof of Lemma 2: δ∗(γ) is obtained by solving fL1+L2s (δ) = f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)
with respect to δ. Now, 0 < γ < 0.794 implies 0 ≤ δ∗(γ) ≤ 0.0(6). So, if
0 < γ < 0.794 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ∗(γ), then fs1,s2L (δ, γ) < f
L1+L2
s (δ). However,
if 0 < γ ≤ 0.794 and δ∗(γ) < δ ≤ 0.0(6), then fL1+L2s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ). The
definitions of fs1+s2L (δ, γ) and f
L1+L2
s (δ) imply that f
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < f
L1+L2
s (δ)
for γ ∈ (0, 1) and fs1+s2L (δ, γ) = f
L1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. Similarly, the definitions
of fs1,s2L (δ, γ) and f
L1,L2
s (δ) imply that f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ) for γ ∈ (0, 1)
and fs1+s2L (δ, γ) = f
L1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. These results imply (i)-(v). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) If 0.74 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ), then Lemma
2 (iv) implies β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ). Prop. 1 (i) and (ii) together with
β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ) imply that m is a dominated strategy for firms
in s. Thus, firms in s choose n. If β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ), then Lemma 2 (iv) also
implies β < fs1,s2L (δ, γ). Prop. 1 (iii) together with β < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) imply that
the best response of firms in L to n is N . So, firms in L will play N . Thus,
NE (F2,γ) = (n,N) for 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ).
(ii) If 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and fL1+L2s (δ) < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ), then Lemma 2 (iv)
implies fs1+s2L (δ, γ) < f
L1+L2
s (δ) < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ). If f
L1+L2
s (δ) <
β < fL1,L2s (δ), then Prop. 1 (i) implies that the best response of firms in s to N
is n and Prop. 1 (ii) implies that the best response of firms in s to M is m. If
fs1+s2L (δ, γ) < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ), then Prop. 1 (iii) implies that the best response
of firms in L to n is N and Prop. 1 (iv) implies that the best response of firms in
L tom isM . Thus, (n,N) and (m,M) are pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE
from now on) of F2,γ when 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and f
L1+L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ).
There exists also a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE from now on) where
firms in s randomize between m and n to make firms in L indifferent between
M and N :
ps
(
(a− c)2
4γ
+
(a− c)2
9β
)
+ (1− ps)
(
(a− c)2
4γ
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
)
= ps
(
(a− c+∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
16β
)
+(1−ps)
(
(a− c+∆)
2
9γ
+
(a− c+ 2∆)
2
25β
+
(a− c− 2∆)
2
9γ
+
(a− c− 3∆)
2
25β
)
,
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where ps is the probability that firms in s choose m. Solving this equation for ps
we obtain (1). Firms in L randomize between M and N to make firms in s in-
different between m and n. Let pL denote the probability that firms in L choose
M . Setting γ = 1 in (1) we obtain (2). Thus, for 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and fL1+L2s (δ) <
β ≤ fs1,s2L (δ, γ), we have NE(F2,γ) = {(n,N) , (m,M), (ps,m; pL,M)} .
(iii) If 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and fs1,s2L (δ, γ) < β, then Lemma 2 (iv) implies f
s1+s2
L (δ, γ)
< fs1,s2L (δ, γ) < β. Prop. 1 (iii) and (iv) together with f
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)
< β imply thatN is a dominated strategy for firms in L. Thus, firms in L choose
M . If fs1,s2L (δ, γ) < β, then Lemma 2 (iv) also implies f
L1+L2
s (δ) < β. Prop. 1
(ii) together with fL1+L2s (δ) < β imply that the best response of firms in s to
M is m. So, firms in s choose m. Thus, for 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ),
we have NE(F2,γ) = (m,M). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) If 0 < γ < 0.794 and β ≤ min[fL1+L2s (δ),
fs1,s2L (δ, γ)], then Lemma 2 (i) or (iii) imply β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ). Prop. 1
(i) and (ii) together with β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ) imply that m is a domi-
nated strategy for firms in s. Thus, firms in s choose n. If β ≤ fs1,s2L (δ, γ), then
Prop. 1 part (iii) implies that the best response of firms in L to n is N . So, firms
in L will play N . Thus, for 0 < γ < 0.794 and β ≤ min{fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)},
we have NE(F2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If 0 < γ < 0.794 and fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ), then Lemma 2 part (i)
implies fs1+s2L (δ, γ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ). Prop. 1 parts
(iii) and (iv) together with fs1+s2L (δ, γ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) ≤ β imply that N is a
dominated strategy for firms in L. Thus, firms in L chooseM . Prop. 1 parts (i)
and (ii) together with β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ) < f
L1,L2
s (δ) imply that m is a dominated
strategy for firms in s. So, firms in s choose n. Thus, for 0 < γ < 0.794
and fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ) we have NE(F2,γ) = (n,M). The proofs
of parts (iii) and (iv) are similar to those of parts (ii) and (iii) of Prop. 2,
respectively. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3:
(i) If 0 < β ≤ gL1,L2s (δ) =
9
50
−7+82δ−183δ2
5−32δ+44δ2
, and firms in the large country are
not merged, then a merger in the small country improves that country’s welfare;
(ii) If 0 < β ≤ gL1+L2s (δ) =
−1+18δ−45δ2
5−32δ+44δ2
, and firms in the large country are
merged, then a merger in the small country improves that country’s welfare;
(iii) If 0 < β ≤ gs1,s2L (δ, γ) =
9γ
50
−7+82δ−183δ2
5−32δ+44δ2
, and firms in the small country
are not merged, then a merger in the large country improves that country’s
welfare;
(iv) If 0 < β ≤ gs1+s2L (δ, γ) = γ
−1+18δ−45δ2
5−32δ+44δ2
and firms in the small country are
merged, then a merger in the large country improves that country’s welfare.
Proof of Lemma 3: I start the proof by stating conditions under which a
domestic merger improves national welfare for a given market structure in L.
Consumer surplus at s is given by CSs = (a−ps)Qs/2 = Q
2
s/2,where Qs is total
output produced by s firms. If s firms do not merge, then Qs = (2a−2c−∆)/3
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and CSss1,s2 = (2a− 2c−∆)
2 /18. If s firms merge, then Qs = (a − c)/2 and
CSss1+s2 = (a − c)
2/8. Thus, a merger of firms in s improves national welfare
when L firms are not merged if
(a− c)2
8
+
(a− c)2
4
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
≥
(2a− 2c−∆)2
18
+
(a− c+∆)
2
9
+
(a− c+ 2∆)2
25β
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
25β
. (5)
Solving (5) with respect to β we obtain β ≤ gL1,L2s (δ) which proves (i). A
merger of firms in s improves national welfare when L firms are merged if
(a− c)2
(
1
8
+
1
4
+
1
9β
)
≥
(2a− 2c−∆)2
18
+
(a− c+∆)2
9
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
16β
. (6)
Solving (6) with respect to β we obtain β ≤ gL1+L2s (δ) which proves (ii). I will
now state conditions under which a L merger improves L welfare conditional
on a given market structure in s. Consumer surplus in L is given by CSL =
(a−pL)QL/2 = γQ
2
L/2,where QL is total output produced by L firms. If L firms
do not merge, then QL = (2a−2c−∆)/3γ and CSLL1,L2 = (2a− 2c−∆)
2 /18γ.
If L firms merge, then QL = (a − c)/2γ and CS
L
L1+L2 = (a − c)
2/8γ. So, a
merger of firms in L improves national welfare when s firms are not merged if
(a− c)2
8γ
+
(a− c)2
4γ
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
≥
(2a− 2c−∆)2
18γ
+
(a− c+∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c+ 2∆)2
25β
+
(a− c− 2∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
25β
. (7)
Solving (7) with respect to β we have β ≤ gs1,s2L (δ, γ) which proves (iii). A
merger of firms in L improves national welfare when s firms are merged if
(a− c)2
(
1
8γ
+
1
4γ
+
1
9β
)
≥
(2a− 2c−∆)2
18γ
+
(a− c+∆)
2
9γ
+
(a− c+∆)
2
16β
+
(a− c− 2∆)
2
9γ
+
(a− c− 3∆)2
16β
. (8)
Solving (8) with respect to β we have β ≤ gs1+s2L (δ, γ) which proves (iv). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof follows from Lemma 3 just as the proof
of Prop. 1 follows from Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Table II displays the strategies and payoffs in the merger game played by gov-
ernments. The upper left part of each cell displays the sum of consumer surplus
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and profits of the merged firm in s (if there is a merger) or with profits of the
two firms in s (if there is no merger). The lower right part of each cell displays
the sum of consumer surplus and profits of the merged firm in L (if there is a
merger) or with profits of the two firms in L (if there is no merger). Denote the
governments’ strategies in the small country as m (merger) and n (no merger)
and in the large country as M (merger) and N (no merger). Denote the merger
game played by governments by G2,γ and its set of Nash equilibria by NE (G2,γ).
Table II
s\L M N
m
(a−c)2
8
+ (a−c)
2
4
+ (a−c)
2
9β ,
(a−c)2
8γ
+ (a−c)
2
4γ
+ (a−c)
2
9β
(a−c)2
8
+ (a−c)
2
4
+ (a−c+∆)
2
16β ,
(2a−2c−∆)2
18γ
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−2∆)2
9γ
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
16β
n
(2a−2c−∆)2
18
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−2∆)2
9
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
16β ,
(a−c)2
8γ
+ (a−c)
2
4γ
+ (a−c+∆)
2
16β
(2a−2c−∆)2
18
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−2∆)2
9
+ (a−c+2∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
25β ,
(2a−2c−∆)2
18γ
+ (a−c+∆)
2+(a−c−2∆)2
9γ
+ (a−c+2∆)
2+(a−c−3∆)2
25β
Lemma 4 Let δˆ(γ) = 63−50γ549−750γ .
(i) If (γ, δ) satisfy 0 < γ ≤ 0.466 and 0.11475 < δ ≤ δˆ(γ), then gs1,s2L (δ, γ) <
gL1,L2s (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ).
(ii) If δ = δˆ(γ) then gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
L1,L2
s (δ) = g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ).
(iii) If (γ, δ) satisfy 0 < γ ≤ 0.466 and δˆ(γ) ≤ δ ≤ 0.1991, then gs1,s2L (δ, γ) <
gs1+s2L (δ, γ) < g
L1,L2
s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ).
(iv) If 0.466 < γ < 1, then gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
L1,L2
s (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ).
(v) If γ = 1, then gs1,s2L (δ, γ) = g
L1,L2
s (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) = g
L1+L2
s (δ).
Proof of Lemma 4: The expression for δˆ(γ) is obtained by solving gL1,L2s (δ) =
gs1+s2L (δ, γ) with respect to δ. Now, 0 < γ ≤ 0.466 implies 0.11475 < δˆ(γ) ≤
0.1991. So, if 0 < γ ≤ 0.466 and δˆ(γ) ≤ δ ≤ 0.1991, then gs1+s2L (δ, γ) <
gL1,L2s (δ). However, if 0 < γ ≤ 0.466 and 0.11475 < δ ≤ δˆ(γ), then g
L1,L2
s (δ) <
gs1+s2L (δ, γ). The definitions of g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) and g
L1+L2
s (δ) imply that g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ)
< gL1+L2s (δ) for γ ∈ (0, 1) and g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) = g
L1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. Similarly,
the definitions of gs1,s2L (δ, γ) and g
L1,L2
s (δ) imply that g
s1,s2
L (δ, γ) < g
L1,L2
s (δ)
for γ ∈ (0, 1) and gs1+s2L (δ, γ) = g
L1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. It is straightforward to
show that these results imply (i) though (v). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5: (i) If 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gs1+s2L (δ, γ) < β, then
Lemma 4 part (iv) implies gL1,L2s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ) < β. Prop. 4 parts (i) and (ii)
together with gL1,L2s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ) < β imply that m is a dominated strategy
for the government of s. Thus, the government of s chooses n. If gs1+s2L (δ, γ) < β,
then Lemma 4 part (iv) also implies gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < β. Prop. 4 part (iii) together
with gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < β imply that the best response of the government of L to
n is N . So, the government of L plays N . Thus, for 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and
gs1+s2L (δ, γ) < β we have NE (G2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gL1,L2s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), then Lemma 4 part (iv)
implies gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
L1,L2
s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ). If g
L1,L2
s (δ) <
β < gL1+L2s (δ), then Prop. 4 part (i) implies that the best response of the
government of s to N is n and Prop. 4 part (ii) implies that the best response of
the government of s to M is m. If gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), then Prop. 4
part (iii) implies that the best response of the government of L to n is N and
Prop. 4 part (iv) implies that the best response of the government of L to m
is M . Thus, (n,N) and (m,M) are PSNE of G2,γ when 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and
gL1,L2s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ). There also exists a MSNE where the government
of s randomizes between m and n to make the government of L indifferent
between M and N :
qs(a−c)
2
(
1
8γ
+
1
4γ
+
1
9β
)
+(1−qs)
(
(a− c)2
8γ
+
(a− c)2
4γ
+
(a− c+∆)2
16β
)
= qs
(
(2a− 2c−∆)2
18γ
+
(a− c+∆)2 + (a− c− 2∆)2
9γ
)
+ qs
(a− c+∆)2 + (a− c− 3∆)2
16β
+ (1− qs)
(2a− 2c−∆)2
18γ
+(1−qs)
(
(a− c+∆)2 + (a− c− 2∆)2
9γ
+
(a− c+ 2∆)2 + (a− c− 3∆)2
25β
)
,
where qs is the probability that the government of s chooses m. Solving this
equation for qs we obtain (3). The government of L randomizes betweenM and
N to make the government of s indifferent between m and n. Let qL denote
the probability that the government of L chooses M . Setting γ = 1 in (3) we
obtain (4). Thus, for 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gL1,L2s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), we have
NE (G2,γ) = {(n,N) , (m,M), (qs,m; qL,M)} .
(iii) If 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ gL1,L2s (δ), then Lemma 4 part (iv) implies
β < gL1,L2s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ). Prop. 4 parts (iii) and (iv) together with β <
gL1,L2s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ) imply that n is a dominated strategy for the government
of s. Thus, the government of s chooses m. If β ≤ gL1,L2s (δ), then Lemma
4 part (iv) also implies β < gs1+s2L (δ, γ). Prop. 4 part (iv) together withβ <
gs1+s2L (δ, γ) imply that the best response of the government of L to m is M .
So, the government of L plays M . Thus, NE(G2,γ) = (m,M) for 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1
and β ≤ gL1,L2s (δ). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: (i) If 0 < γ < 0.466 and max{gs1+s2L (δ, γ), g
L1,L2
s (δ)}
< β, then Lemma 4 (i) or (iii) imply gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < β. Prop. 4
(iii) and (iv) together with gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) < β imply that M is a
dominated strategy for the government of L. If gL1,L2s (δ) < β, then Prop. 4
(ii) implies that the best response of the government of s to N is n. Thus,
NE (G2,γ) = (n,N) for 0.466 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and max{g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), g
L1,L2
s (δ)} < β.
(ii) If 0 < γ < 0.466 and gs1+s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ g
L1,L2
s (δ), then Lemma 4 (iii)
implies gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ g
L1,L2
s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ). Prop. 4
(iii) and (iv) together with gs1,s2L (δ, γ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ) ≤ β imply that M is
a dominated strategy for the government of L. Prop. 4 (i) and (ii) together
with β ≤ gL1,L2s (δ) < g
L1+L2
s (δ) imply that n is a dominated strategy for
the government of s. Thus, NE(G2,γ) = (m,N) for 0 < γ < 0.466 and
gs1+s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ g
L1,L2
s (δ). The proofs of (iii) and (iv) are similar to those of
(ii) and (iii) of Prop. 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 7: Let 0.794 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
(i) If 0 < β ≤ fL1+L2s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If max{fs1,s2L (δ, γ), g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ)} ≤ β ≤ 1, then NE(F2,γ) = (m,M) =
(n,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(iii) If 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2s (δ), 1}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) = (m,M).
Proof of Proposition 7: The proof follows from Propositions 2 and 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8: Let 0.466 ≤ γ < 0.794.
(i) If 0 < β ≤ min{fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) =
(n,N);
(ii) If fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (n,M) = (n,N) =
NE(G2,γ);
(iii) If max {fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ), g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ)} ≤ β ≤ 1, then NE(F2,γ) =
(m,M) = (n,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(iv) If 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2s (δ), 1}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) = (m,M).
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof follows from Propositions 3 and 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9: Let 0 < γ < 0.466.
(i) If 0 < β ≤ min{fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ)}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) =
(n,N);
(ii) If fs1,s2L (δ, γ) ≤ β ≤ f
L1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (n,M) = (n,N) =
NE(G2,γ);
(iii) If max{fL1+L2s (δ), f
s1,s2
L (δ, γ), g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), g
L1,L2
s (δ)} ≤ β ≤ 1, then
NE(F2,γ) = (m,M) = (n,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(iv) If gs1+s2L (δ, γ) < β ≤ g
L1,L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (m,M) = (m,N) =
NE(G2,γ);
(v) If 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2s (δ), g
s1+s2
L (δ, γ), 1}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) =
(m,M).
Proof of Proposition 9: The proof follows from Propositions 3 and 6. Q.E.D.
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